Hailing from Austria, Walter Schleiss followed his brother Fred to Canada in the late-1950s. He began his career as a Visitor Safety Specialist in Jasper National Park, but soon joined the Snow Research and Avalanche Warning Section in Glacier National Park. He spent over 30 years working in Rogers Pass, where he served as an avalanche forecaster and helped develop the Pass’ world-renowned avalanche program alongside his brother Fred. He was a founding member of the Canadian Avalanche Association in 1981 and served as the membership director for several years in the 1980s. He retired in 1991 and lives in Revelstoke, B.C.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Walter Schleiss.
John Woods: This is John Woods on behalf of the Canadian Avalanche Association oral history project. As the CAA approaches its fortieth birthday in 2021, we are speaking with former association Board members and staff to help preserve the CAA’s rich history through the eyes of those who worked to make the association a world leader in avalanche safety professionalism. Today, Thursday, February 6th, 2020, I’m joined by Walter Schleiss in Revelstoke, British Columbia.
Thank you for joining me today. Walter.
Walter Schleiss:You’re welcome, John.
I’d like to start by asking how you became part of the Canadian avalanche industry?
Fred[1] was involved in avalanche work because he was a surveyor. He was working in a power station in one of the biggest electrical power stations—well the biggest in Austria for sure. It was Kaprun[2], and he was involved there with avalanche work. They were doing avalanche sheds and static defenses, and also a little bit of control work. I wasn’t involved in that, but I was involved in skiing. I grew up with skiing (in Austria), right.
But then afterwards, the way it really started, Fred came over (to Canada). He started working in Prince George, in a mill actually, but afterwards, he was ski-racing in Jasper and talking with the Superintendent in Jasper. They saw he is a climber, he is a skier, he knows about avalanches. Avalanches wasn’t that big a deal in Jasper itself, so, they hired him as the climbing—what do you call them—the alpine specialist for the Icefields[3].
And then, the year following (after) Fred, I came over. And then Fred, when they started the avalanche work in Rogers Pass with Noel Gardner[4], that’s when the regional director, Webster, at the time, approached Fred and said would he be interested in being the second avalanche forecaster in Rogers Pass, because Noel Gardner was on a contract basis[5]. They wanted somebody that was a civil servant. In other words, with the government, to back them up, because as a contract person, maybe they had (one) year, or maybe not there the following year.
So, that’s why Fred was there. Fred was hired, came in that year in 1959. He came earlier (than I did). When all of a sudden, an opening came up for an assistant observer, they called them, and he asked me if I wanted to come in. At that point I said, “Sure.” So, I came in, that was my start being in Rogers Pass. My only experience in avalanche work was backcountry skiing for myself. But Fred was the expert that knew about it (avalanche work), or to a degree. And from there on we started working and developing. Some of it definitely was with Noel Gardner. He actually started the idea of the shear tests and we developed them further and then formalized them in ’66-’67. That’s the beginning.
And you came to Rogers Pass and Fred was already working in avalanches, in avalanche forecasting. Did he have the forecaster’s position at that point?
Right. He had the position from the government[6].
We had developed the whole idea of a chart to say when conditions would be right for avalanche control and so forth. As to when we should get there, we had actually big charts considering penetration and other aspects of the snow work.
Noel sort of said that we should do something (like this) and Fred developed it.
So, in ’65 Noel left and Fred was considered as the avalanche forecaster and I was considered the second one.
Just to be clear: Fred preceded you to Rogers Pass, and your background in avalanches was previously in Europe just as a skier?
Yes. Nothing formalized like we have here now.
Fred took some more formal training, did he not?
He was involved in Europe because it was avalanche terrain that they had to go through in order to do some work. So, they built snowsheds, small snowsheds, for workers to go to work and stuff like that. So, he was involved in that aspect of it.
So, by 1965, you’re both there (in Rogers Pass). Noel Gardner has left. Fred is the senior avalanche forecaster.
Yes.
And you are the second-in-command of the Snow Research and Avalanche Warning Section—SRAWS, as it was called at that time. Is that right?
[Walter agrees].
So, at that time, who else was involved in B.C. or Alberta in avalanche safety? Were there any other operations?
Well, they started up at a mine up north, right on the coast [Walter couldn’t remember the name of the mine].
The question (of avalanche safety) came up even there, like in ’65. There was definitely a copper[7] mine, big copper mine north of Prince Rupert—I’d have to look at a map. They had the approach to that through avalanche terrain, but it was just a mine. And at that point, I was personally approached to, “Do I want to maybe go up there as the forecaster?” Well, I was not interested because I saw that the actual avalanche problem in Rogers Pass was far superior, and more steady (work) also. I mean, a mine may last four or five years, 10 years, then it’s finished. It could last longer. Who knows? Plus, it was a lot more interesting to work in developing the avalanche work in Rogers Pass.
So you didn’t have then in those early years, the ’60s, much contact with other places that were doing avalanche work?
Not too much, no.
They (avalanche professionals from other areas) would come in and visit. I forget who even they were[8]. We had visitors come from Europe. That was even after ’65 right, because they were interested in how we were controlling avalanches in regard to the highway. But (we had) personal contact within our organization. We had some contact, I would say with the government work in Banff Park. We had wardens come in to get some training. And that didn’t last long because we found in general they came in for a few weeks—like five, four weeks over time.
And it was fine to train them when the conditions were such that you didn’t have to worry about avalanche conditions. But as soon as you had to worry about avalanche conditions, you had to do the work. You couldn’t train them.
So that brings up the point then, Walter—how were your staff trained? What experience did you expect them to have before joining your operation with you as the forecaster?
While they were formally trained by us. If we got a new person, they were trained in place by taking them out, taking observations, by taking them out and showing them avalanche paths. Most new men we started out in Rogers Pass, the most important part was to get observations that are relevant to conditions as they existed. So, we trained them in taking these observations.
Your training for your staff, was in-house?
In-house.
How many staff were we talking about in the ’60s?
In the 60s, we had an avalanche forecaster, then we had an observer, and then we had generally about maybe two assistant observers on a shift, so the total amount of people would be about eight in a crew. We (worked) in two shifts.
You were a crew of eight. You and Fred for many years had that crew. Fred the head and you the second-in-command. You divided your operation. The people in your crew, you trained in-house with your methods and standards?
That’s right.
When you were hiring, what were you looking for in terms of people to join the crew?
They had to be good skiers, obviously, because we had to go up the mountain to get observations. Second of all, their background training was questioned and likely because of the hiring system within the government, you had to give accreditation to people that were maybe well-educated, in regard to taking anything, observations, it would help, supposedly.
The only problem I had personally with that was you know that the person that was well-educated, and we got people that had bachelor’s degrees or whatever, you know they were there for a short time in order to get experience and are likely, not necessarily, but likely, to leave to advance themselves.
My personal thing was, do you know Mike Pittaway?
No, I don’t know (him). I’ve heard the name, as you said, Mike Pittaway?
Mike, not Bert Pittaway, Bert Pittaway was the Chief Warden.
Mike Pittaway was hired and he was an assistant observer and all that up there, but he was hired back out of high school. But what I saw at the time is when you get people that you could train to the operation, they were good skiers, obviously, interested in the work. Interested to get educated and likely, they were people that would stay with the operation.
In other words, you wouldn’t have trained people consistently. When you had somebody well educated, you would have time for maybe a couple or three years, then they would go on from there. Which is totally understandable, but it would be a task to the (on-going) operation, that you not have to start training new people again. Which is, in my opinion, this is a handicap to the operation in the sense that when you hire somebody new and you have to now educate them again, at the time that conditions could be bad, it puts additional stress on the operation or the people that are running it.
But the reality was you had to contend with that?
You had to contend with it. And sometimes it worked out and sometimes we just lost. But we went through, I don’t even know (how many people). Fred had the list at one time. So, people that you’d lost and went through, educating them, and then they left—it was enormous.[9]
So you were running then, potentially what could be considered a dual-training program[10] back in the ’60s.
We had observers that came in. Next thing you know, they left, and they started up (for example) down in Fernie, the avalanche operation.
They could have gone to other places, but that’s what the reality of it was. We trained them and after a while they saw, “Oh, OK, now I want to carry on and maybe do my own thing.” Which is totally understandable. The only thing is it always puts an onus on the operation (Rogers Pass), right?
Rogers Pass then, being such a large avalanche operation, relative to, I take it to anybody else at that time, it not only was serving to help (train) observers for the Pass (Rogers), but you were (training) some people (who left for) other areas in B.C. after they did some time (at Rogers Pass).
[Walter agrees throughout].
Can you think of some examples of people who went on from there?
Aikens. I forget the first name.[11] He went to Fernie. He actually started their avalanche safety program at Fernie. It would have been around the ’70s[12].
And there would be no other avalanche operation during the ‘60s and ‘70s that was of the scale that they were actually training people who then went off elsewhere, as they move through their careers?
Not really. Not that I know.
So, to be one of your observers, assistant observer and then observer, the essential quality then (was) they had to be able to backcountry ski?
Absolutely.
And (have) the physical fitness that goes with that, those were essential?
In the earlier days, we actually took the people who would apply up to Fidelity and let them ski in deep snow just to see what they were capable of or not.
And after that, like I said, the basics we were interested (in): if you were capable and were interested and had at least high school education, or a little bit (more), I guess. We were prepared after that to do the training from the get-go, to do it (the job) according to what we’ve wanted out there (in Rogers Pass), the standard we had.
You were in that job for many, many years. When did you leave? When did you retire then Walter?
1991. Both Fred, myself.
Both Fred and yourself retired in 1991. How had it changed? You were there from the ’60s, ’70s, ’80s, and early 90s. Did you start finding people were applying who had already taken some avalanche training near the end of that time period?
Not particularly.
You’ve described how you came into the avalanche history and a bit about the Rogers Pass operation and the scale of it. Could you now tell me about your, and perhaps your brother Fred’s, involvement with the Canadian Avalanche Association?
In general terms, we were talking about the avalanche association with—not myself, but Fred more—with Peter Schaerer, who used to be up in Rogers Pass, hired by the National Research Council. He (Peter) was hired by them to do research in avalanche work. He used to occasionally talk with Fred, and I was included occasionally, about the start of what an avalanche association should be, or what their aims should be.
Peter Schaerer was already (doing), and so (also) did Fred to a degree, and myself occasionally, (we) did lectures, educational sessions. Like myself once, down at Number 3 Highway, Kootenay Pass. I was there one time instructing people in avalanche work—actually, it was backcountry-skiing, for safety measures. Peter Schaerer used to hold courses and used to hold them actually in Rogers Pass, also. And so, the safety aspect for not only the professionals, but for people in general, going into the backcountry skiing, to give them some background so that they would not go out and expose themselves to hazardous conditions if it was avoidable. So that was sort of the talk.
What time frame would that have been?
Probably Peter would know better on that, but I would say years before that, that consideration actually was more in Peter’s mind because he was in the research and had time to spend on these things. You ask, being in an operation, actually, I couldn’t spend that much, or even give it much thought. But talking with Peter naturally, it came up once in a while, every so often. And in ’81, we finally met at the beginning of what I consider the very beginning of the (Canadian) Avalanche Association, in ’81 in West Broadway.[13]
We met with Peter Schaerer, Willi Pfisterer, Chris Stethem, (Clair) Israelson, Fred and myself, and we decided who would be president and so forth, and what the aim of the association should be. And that’s the beginning. As far as I was concerned, I was only involved as the membership chairman because I couldn’t see myself doing anything more involved because of Rogers Pass operation. I could not get away from that (in winter).
So, perhaps we can just take a sideline then for a moment, from the association’s development, why couldn’t you get away in the winter?
In the winter, it was absolutely necessary because avalanche conditions in Rogers Pass could develop at any time. And we had to react accordingly, seeing we’re in Rogers Pass, the aim of trying to keep as much as possible the highway only closed for a couple hours at a time. And you had to do that during the night, day, or whatever, 24-hours. And myself being the second forecaster there had to sometimes even to cover when Fred, as the first forecaster, but more involved with the avalanche association, maybe went on a meeting, in which case somebody had to cover, and that was me.
Because at the time you were running a 24-hour operation with each of you taking half of the day, like 12hours, is that right?
No. We really had shifts that I would be working from Friday until Tuesday, and Fred worked the regular week (Monday to Friday).
So, Fred’s role, though, what was his role then? He was at the original meeting with you. You became the membership secretary.
Applications for members would be sent to me at Rogers Pass for approval to see what (their) background justified. At that time, the membership consisted of professionals in the field only, and there was a certain standard that was decided by the association that you should have in order to become a professional member of the association. Like, not just a skier that would go into the backcountry and wanted to become a member. At that time, we actually had professionals only as members.
So, your job as membership secretary, was to review their credentials?
I reviewed applications and accreditation of what their experience was in the field, or what they would be doing in the field. Generally it was pretty much accepted that they would be accepted anyway. But in case he didn’t have a professional involvement, it excluded him at that time as becoming a member.
From the earliest days of the association, it was viewed as for practitioners, actually active practitioners of avalanche safety and science, not people who just might be interested in it?
That’s right.
And that was as membership secretary, that was your role?
That was my role.
Who was the first president?
Peter Schaerer.
Peter Schaerer was the first President. And then was Fred involved with the board directly? When was Fred the President?
After Peter Schaerer. It had to be several years later, but I don’t know the exact date.
So, you’re the membership secretary then, the membership board member chair, then. It’s not just collecting dues and information, but literally looking at: do they have the kind of background (suitable for professional membership)?
Yes, they had to submit a letter that, because it was just a set (of the necessary qualifications). This is the part that I could do because if they sent it to Rogers Pass and I did it according to what they gave me as their background to make that decision. But I didn’t have to leave Rogers Pass in order to do that.
So, this is why you being the membership chair was a good fit for you.
For me (it was).
Because you can do it from Rogers Pass, you didn’t have to go and interview people and that sort of thing?
It was strictly a paper type of interview…
… Checking the qualifications so that the group (the CAA) became a professional group. How long were you the membership secretary?
I probably stepped out of that when Fred became the President (of the CAA). I forget. A few years.
But right from the start, you were looking at that (professional qualifications for membership)?
So then, you said, Fred became the president, Fred Schleiss, and then you were no longer then on the board?
I wouldn’t say not on the board. I don’t know. I could be wrong in that because we went for years and to meetings like, “Oh, I wonder how long?” Because we went to meetings, not in the middle of the winter, but in the fall or whenever in the spring, whenever meetings were arranged.[14]
We tried to establish that professionals in the field should take a minimum of standard observations at standard times in order to assess the avalanche hazard. Now this became very questionable, difficult to do for people like helicopter-skiing. Because what we tried to establish is very hard to do for helicopter-skiing, to go into an area, because they differ so much.
Anyway, we had to deal with problems, various problems, that in helicopter-skiing you cannot have one observation in a particular area to represent everything because they (heli-skiing operations) cover so much terrain. So, then they went from there on their own advice, that they actually went to say, OK, when they do helicopter-skiing, they go into an area, first go in and do maybe a snow profile or whatever, in order to assess conditions generally in that area before they ski down.
Are these standards, Walter, that you’re talking about, (the) procedures?
Procedures that they established for each operation. Actually, helicopter-skiing operations established these standards. We were all well-involved in talking about it, naturally. But we had a representative of that. Mike Wiegele came to these meetings because he had an operation (heli-skiing) running up at Blue River.
And this was a standard established in order to make it safe or considered safe for helicopters, for skiing. Sadly, what happened, you probably know about, Freddie Pfisterer. he was the son of Willi Pfisterer, he was working for Wiegele and he was doing that particular profile. But he exposed himself a little bit too far out and the avalanche took him down and he was a fatality.
Willi Pfisterer being the alpine specialist for many years in Jasper, and this is his son?
His son was a guide for Mike Wiegele at Blue River.
Do you remember when that incident happened?
It would be probably be in the 80s, mid-80s[15].
So this is apart from your job in Rogers Pass then, that’s still going. But you’re now involved in this CAA initiative to develop protocols for the heli-ski industry.
And that side involved also, through Peter Schaerer, the establishment of giving courses for anybody interested in the safety of backcountry-skiing.
So, these are courses to the professional, not to the general public?
But even to the general public. After a while it was established for them also. Because it’s usually the professionals only, and then there are people going in the backcountry and not being aware of what is going on.
So, you’re working on this then, as a member then of the CAA, helping to establish professional standards for observations. In this case, particularly, heli-ski operations. But what about standards in general?
We had a representative on these meetings afterward from all types of operations. Not only for helicopter-skiers, but also from mining operations that had to deal with it (avalanches). And Chris Stethem did some contract. I don’t know who for, but some of it was maybe for mining or for even logging outfits. Anybody involved in the field at some point had an input into what was being developed or what should have been developed for certain operations.
So again, we’re talking about operational standards. You have operational standards for Rogers Pass.
We’ve always had one (operational standards).
Now, what about OGRS[16], I’ve heard this term. Is it operational guidelines and standards?
That’s beyond me, that came up afterward…
So, these operational standards were written down, weren’t just discussed.
They were as minutes in what we had (for CAA meetings). There was always the question of—at least during the years that I attended—the question was that people within certain operations didn’t want to be tied down too close because they were, at that time, a little bit afraid of what would happen if something happened and they didn’t carry out exactly the guidelines. They were afraid.
From what I understand, after I was not a part anymore, people wanted to get some kind of insurance in these operations, and insurance companies turned around and said, “If you don’t have strict operational observation guidelines carried out, we cannot really give you insurance.” That’s what I understood.
So in your days, before that requirement you still were talking about it as professionals?
That’s right.[17]
And so, that preceded the very official set standards?
Well, first there was, I know, not particular to individuals, but they were afraid. In Rogers Pass, we took observations starting every morning at 7 a.m. and if conditions vary naturally, more often at any time required. But the 7 was a given, and the same thing in the afternoon at either 4 o’clock or 5 o’clock. Twice a day, that was the standard for Rogers Pass.
We also were talking with other operations (what) they should have, depending on the operation. Not like in Rogers Pass, (where) everybody started to work at 7 in the morning. So, we wanted the readings in no later than just before that, to assess that they should go out. Is it safe? OK.
And we felt for other operations that should be a standard also. We did not say that day that the time should be a hard thing. It depends on the operation. If the operation starts at 10 in the morning, you would want an observation as a standard, let’s say at 9, so that by the time they start at 10, you know what the hazard was. And (it was a) little hassle for some of these operations to tie them down to a standard for that, but it became standard after a while. I think they’re doing it now.
What was your connection with what became InfoEx? Did InfoEx happen after your time?
What’s that?
That’s a system that the CAA has for communication amongst many, many areas.
We gave information to the CAA as soon as it was established. Rogers Pass gave information every day.
Were you receiving information from other areas?
We were not receiving information from others. Rogers Pass was standing by itself.
But you were disseminating some information. And how would you disseminate that?
At first, we used to do it by Telex[18]. And then, it started by phone.
So, in your time, you never had something coming in to you telling you what’s going on the coast, in the mountains?
Rogers Pass, during our operation, never required this because we knew what was going on in Rogers Pass. The input from the coast was immaterial. We did our own observations, did our own work, as good as we could. And anything extra is giving us… There is such a thing as getting too much information, even in making observations. Because if you get too much, how do you deal with it?
We did have a professional that actually took our observations and avalanche occurrences, and tried to come up with a model of developing an avalanche forecasting model. But in order to make it fit the occurrences of avalanches, he adjusted his model, which all of a sudden, in order to make it fit, he neglected to take very important parts of avalanche hazard into consideration, like available snow or penetration, whatever you want to call it. And other things, he ignored them because it didn’t fit the model. So, the thing is really that you have to, in any area, decide the important parts, but don’t overload your own consideration of the hazard. If you have too much information, you just get confused.
So, you had your own telemetry network. You have teams of observers. You have quite a wide area coverage from the provincial snow sheds all the way through the Beaver Valley to the other side of the park. You have the direct observations as well. And the snow pits and everything that your crew is doing. So, that’s the information you need to run Rogers Pass. But you then shared some of that information with other operations as you said by Telex?
Yes, because of what was happening. At least, this is what I thought what was happening the conditions to be, let’s say at the time, prevalent at Rogers Pass had a bearing for the Columbia Mountains in general. Right? Any people that were operating anywhere in that area could use that information and apply it to however they did, and then check up on their own.
So, to pick up on that, you have your observations and you’re making them available to people who are in the vicinity of Rogers Pass, like in the Columbia Mountains?
We actually disseminated them to the Avalanche Association. And then, from the Avalanche Association, it was available, I assume, to whoever wanted it.
So, that was your input role. But were they not giving you back, as a member of the organization, weren’t you getting something back from them? Reports?
No.
OK. So, you’re the source of it. Well, that’s good. Now, in those days, Walter, you mentioned you were involved in the training to some extent, training schools. Can you talk about that, was that on behalf of the CAA?
Actually, I’m not sure. My own involvement was actually before that.
Before the CAA?
I think so. Let me see—when did Kootenay Pass (avalanche operation) start?[19] I forget now. Yeah, it had to be before.
So, there was some training going on before the official start (of the CAA) in 1981. And you were involved in that?
Yeah, Peter Schaerer was running courses for people before that.
We talked a bit about standards, informally about standards. You discussed those. That was an early role of the (CAA). So, for other people particularly, they had an opportunity to discuss this (standards) amongst a group of people who were out there working in avalanche safety.
With the Avalanche Association, we told them what observations we took at Rogers Pass and when we took them, as a standard. So, all that was available to anybody that wanted it or to whom it applied. Now, the differences in all of that is you have maybe a base model and then you had to apply and adjust and disregard some things and add other things, right.
Just moving on to another topic to do with the CAA, Walter, I’m just wondering from your perspective now, how many years have you been involved with avalanche work?
Totally involved for about 32 years.
If you think then, of the subset of that, that included the association, what do you think the most significant accomplishments have been of the CAA?
Well, the most significant, significant one, as far as I’m definitely concerned, is to be a source for professionals for information. Also, and I think that’s probably one of the bigger things, is to make the avalanche hazard for different areas available to people that go into the backcountry skiing. Or not only backcountry skiing, but also for ski-doers. Well, really, in a way, (they are) a bigger problem because they get into areas that are not that safe sometimes with their machines. We’ve seen it at Revelstoke when they were holding, on Boulder Mountain[20] at a training session, and then all of a sudden the whole hillside came down on them. So, because the way they approach it, these ki-dos generally approach hazardous areas from the bottom. And then they scoot right up into it, which makes it very hazardous. So, it’s very important for them, to know the hazard situation.
So, as I think the dissemination to the public of our avalanche hazard conditions is a big achievement. Naturally, you can disseminate to people, if they don’t observe them or follow them, then (there is) nothing you can do about that.
The association was involved in disseminating information, as I understand it, in its early years, but it split off eventually to be Avalanche Canada as a separate public part, separate from the professional part. But I think that happened after your time.
It must have happened after.
So, looking again from your perch of many, many years, looking to the future, what challenges do you see for the association and how do you think the CAA can best face them?
That’s a good question because like you say, I’ve been 30[21] years out of it. [laughs]
Not being that involved in it, I am really not aware of what kind of problems they’re facing right now.
What about if we generalize that question to take it away from the Avalanche Association perspective, but just avalanche professionals in the modern day? Are things changing or are there trends you can think of?
Walter Schleiss I think with new technologies and everything else, things would change.
It won’t make any difference to people that go into the backcountry skiing because you can have all the techniques and all the new stuff you want. They’re going to go with a rucksack and go skiing. Right. So, how do you get people to listen to what you tell them? But how do you do that?
That’s a question I have no answer to, because if somebody, number one, is not interested in getting information, what do you do about it? And number two, even they get the information, if they decide they know better anyway and go out and do it, how do you deal that? I don’t know, I have no clue.
And of course, now there are so many more people.
Like in everything else it applies to, and I’m out of totally from the Rogers Pass as far as it goes, but obviously, as the traffic increases, we used to…
Just to go back, we used to be able to hold traffic in certain areas for a certain time. Let them go, and sometimes an hour, an hour-and-a-half, then close the next section (of highway) and do it again. And now, many times when they do, from what I understand in Rogers Pass, when they go out shooting, they just close the whole Pass down for four or five hours mainly because they are not capable of holding the traffic in the areas that are available, that are safe. So, they have to do that.
Everything changes as traffic (changes), or also as people go into the backcountry. We used to—to go back now in the late-50s, 60s—we used to get the odd people going out into the backcountry on skis and whatnot. But you just about could count them on your hands, you know, in Rogers Pass. Now, I guess, this is a regular ski hill area going on out there.
Another thing is communication changed this. When we were there, communications with skiers going into the backcountry was not available. So, when they left, they were out on their own until they got back. So, for that reason, all areas that were controlled by us or even close to be controlled areas, skiers couldn’t go skiing. From what I understand now in Rogers Pass, they can go into these areas where we actually control, but because of availability by cell phones or whatever, maybe you can actually recall skiers that are maybe out skiing. That was not available to us, for what, for 30 years.
Is there anything else you’d like to add Walter?
I wish them (the CAA) all the luck and good success with whatever they do, which I think they’re doing a good job.
Thank you.
You’re welcome.
[1] Fred Schleiss, Walter’s older brother
[2] Very large dam for hydro-electric generation near Kaprun, Austria 47.188001° 12.721143°
[3] Columbia Icefields, Jasper National Park
[4] Pioneering avalanche worker in Rogers Pass
[5] Noel Gardner started as a Park Warden but became involved in the first avalanche surveys in Rogers Pass and worked at various times as both an employee of Parks Canada and a contractor for Parks Canada and Public Works Canada
[6] As an employee in contrast to Noel Gardner who was a contractor at that point
[7] Accessed via Stewart; likely he is referring to the Granduc Mine.
[8] Walter later recalled Monty Atwater and Ed LaChapelle visiting Noel Gardner in the early years
[9] On review Walter added that
[10] People trained to a consistent standard in Rogers Pass but then who either stayed in the Pass operation or who left to work in avalanche safety elsewhere creating the need to always be training new people
[11] Dave Aikens
[12] Fernie Snow Valley Pro Patrol
[13] West Broadway is a street in Vancouver, BC
[14] Walter later clarified that although he was no longer the membership secretary, he still participated in some board meetings
[15] Fred Pfisterer and six guests died in an avalanche while heli-skiing on March 23, 2023.
[16] Currently OGRS = Observational Guidelines and Recording Standards for Weather, Snowpack and Avalanches
[17] Walter later clarified that formal requirements addressing insurance issues happened after he retired.
[18] Telex was a system of communications for transmitting written messages (sending and receiving) dedicated teleprinters using the phone lines.
[19] The program would have started at some point in the 70s. See this article by John Tweedy for information.
[20] 2010_03_13, 2 on Boulder Mountain near Revelstoke, BC, 2 fatalities
[21] Later clarified as 30 years, not 40 years as given in interview